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Abstract
Central banks regularly communicate about financial stability issues, by publishing 
Financial Stability Reports (FSRs) and through speeches and interviews. The paper asks 
how such communications affect financial markets. Building a unique dataset, it provides   
an empirical assessment of the reactions of stock markets to more than 1000 releases   
of FSRs and speeches by 37 central banks over the past 14 years. The findings suggest that 
FSRs have a significant and potentially long-lasting effect on stock market returns, and 
also tend to reduce market volatility. Speeches and interviews, in contrast, have little effect   
on market returns and do not generate a volatility reduction during tranquil times, but 
have had a substantial effect during the 2007-10 financial crisis. The findings suggest that 
financial stability communication by central banks are perceived by markets to contain 
relevant  information,  and  they  underline  the  importance  of  differentiating  between 
communication tools, their content and the environment in which they are employed.
JEL classification: E44, E58, G12.
Keywords: central bank, financial stability, communication, event study.Non-technical summary
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Non-technical summary
The global financial crisis has triggered heated discussions on how best to achieve 
financial  stability  in  the  future.  An  important  role  in  that  regard  has  been  assigned   
to central banks, many of which have explicit financial stability mandates. In the light of this, 
a large number of central banks have communicated extensively on financial stability-related 
matters, e.g. through the publication of Financial Stability Reports (FSRs) and financial 
stability-related speeches and interviews. 
The aim of the current paper is to shed light on the potential effects of central bank 
communication about financial stability. It takes a financial market perspective and studies 
how financial sector stock indices react to the release of such communication, given that 
the financial sector is one of its main addressees. For that purpose, the paper constructs   
a  unique  and  novel  database  on  communication  comprising  more  than  1000  releases   
of FSRs and speeches/interviews by central bank governors from 37 central banks over   
a time period from 1996 to 2009, i.e. spanning nearly one and a half decades. The degree 
of optimism that is expressed in these communications is determined using a computerized 
textual-analysis software.
A first striking finding from this classification is that the tone of FSRs had continuously 
become more optimistic after 2000, reaching a peak already in early and becoming more 
pessimistic thereafter. This stylized fact, together with formal tests conducted in the paper, 
suggests that FSRs comment on the current market environment, but also contain forward-
looking assessments of risks and vulnerabilities. 
The  paper’s  findings  suggest  that  communication  about  financial  stability  has   
important  repercussions  for  financial  sector  stock  prices.  Moreover,  there  are  clear 
differences between FSRs, on the one hand, and speeches and interviews, on the other. 
FSRs clearly create news in the sense that the views expressed in FSRs move stock markets 
in the expected direction. This effect is quite sizeable as, on average, FSR releases move 
equity markets by more than 1% during the subsequent month. Another important finding 
is that FSRs also reduce noise, as market volatility tends to decline in response to FSRs. These 
effects are particularly strong if the FSR contains an optimistic assessment of the risks to 
financial stability, when FSRs are found to move equity markets upwards in up to two thirds 
of the cases. Speeches and interviews, in contrast, have only modest effects on stock market 
returns, and cannot reduce market volatility. 
However, the effects of FSRs and speeches crucially depend on market conditions and 
other factors. Importantly, during the financial crisis, FSRs were moving financial markets less 
than before the crisis, while speeches by governors did move financial markets. Finally, the 
results indicate that financial stability communication of central banks influences financial 
markets primarily via a coordination channel, i.e. it provides relevant information which 
exerts a significant and persistent effect on markets.
The findings of the paper suggest that financial stability communication by central 
banks are indeed perceived by markets to contain relevant information. They underline that 
communication by monetary authorities on financial stability issues can indeed influence 
financial  market  developments.  Yet  the  findings  also  show  that  such  communication 
entails risks as they may unsettle markets. Hence central bank communication on financial 
stability issues needs to be employed with utmost care, stressing the difficulty of designing 
a successful communication strategy on these matters.Introduction





The global financial crisis has triggered heated discussions on how best to achieve 
financial  stability  in  the  future.  An  important  role  in  that  regard  has  been  assigned   
to central banks, many of which have explicit financial stability mandates. In the light of this, 
a large number of central banks have communicated extensively on financial stability-related 
matters, e.g. through the publication of Financial Stability Reports (FSRs) and financial 
stability-related speeches and interviews. 
The aim of the current paper is to shed light on the potential effects of central bank 
communication about financial stability. It takes a financial market perspective and studies 
how financial sector stock indices react to the release of such communication, given that the 
financial sector is one of its main addressees. Doing so, it covers a large number of countries 
over nearly one and a half decades, and studies the effects of FSRs as well as of speeches 
and interviews by central bank governors. 
An assessment of the effects of financial stability-related communication requires   
a view on its aims. In line with the aims put forward by Blinder et al. (2008), we focus on 
the potential of such communication to “create news” and to “reduce noise”. A number 
of central banks have specified the purpose of their FSRs. The ECB’s reports, for instance, 
aim “to promote awareness in the financial industry and among the public at large of 
issues that are relevant for safeguarding the stability of the euro area financial system.   
By providing an overview of sources of risk and vulnerability for financial stability, the Review 
also seeks to play a role in preventing financial crises” (European Central Bank, 2011,   
p. 7).1 In light of these statements, it is interesting to study to what extent the views that   
a central bank expresses in its communications get reflected in the markets. For instance, 
if the central bank expresses a rather pessimistic view about the prospects for financial 
stability, and this view gets heard in financial markets, we would expect that stock prices for 
the financial sector decline. In that sense, these communications “create news”. The other 
motive, to “reduce noise”, should then be reflected in market volatility, in the sense that   
a communication by the central bank should contribute to reducing uncertainty in financial 
markets, thereby reducing volatility. 
But why, and through what channels should central bank communications have an 
effect on financial markets at all? A number of factors could come into play here. First, 
the central bank is obviously an important player in financial markets. For instance, if it 
is ready to change its policy rates, it can directly affect asset prices. Its communication 
can therefore exert effects through what has been labelled the “signalling channel” in the 
literature on foreign exchange interventions (e.g., Kaminsky and Lewis 1996). Second, the 
analyses that feed into the communications are potentially of high quality, and there are 
few other institutions communicating about financial stability, such that a central bank 
publication might indeed contain news. Thus, a co-ordination channel might be at play, 
whereby  communication  by  the  central  bank  works  as  a  co-ordination  device,  thereby 
reducing heterogeneity in expectations and information, and thus inducing asset prices 
to more closely reflect the underlying fundamentals, a channel that has also been found 
1  In a similar vein, the Bank of England’s FSRs aim “to identify the major downside risks to the UK financial   
system and thereby help financial firms, authorities and the wider public in managing and preparing for   
these risks.” See http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/fsr/index.htm. Introduction
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to be important to explain the effect of foreign exchange interventions (Sarno and Taylor 
2001, Fratzscher 2008). This channel might imply that communications have longer-lasting 
effects, as they might change the dynamics in financial markets.
To conduct the empirical analysis, the paper constructs a unique and novel database 
on communication comprising more than 1000 releases of FSRs and speeches/interviews 
by central bank governors from 37 central banks and over the past 14 years. We not only 
identify the precise timing of these communications, but we also determine their content. 
We employ a computerized textual-analysis software (called DICTION 5.0), which allows us 
to grade each of the central bank financial stability statements, based on different semantic 
features, according to the degree of optimism that is expressed.
A first striking finding from this classification is that the tone of FSRs had continuously 
become more optimistic after 2000, reaching a peak already in early 2006 and becoming 
more pessimistic thereafter. This stylized fact, together with formal tests conducted in the 
paper, suggests that FSRs comment on the current market environment, but also contain 
forward-looking assessments of risks and vulnerabilities. 
The  paper’s  findings  suggest  that  communication  about  financial  stability  has   
important  repercussions  for  financial  sector  stock  prices.  Moreover,  there  are  clear 
differences between FSRs, on the one hand, and speeches and interviews, on the other. 
FSRs clearly create news in the sense that the views expressed in FSRs move stock markets 
in the expected direction. This effect is quite sizeable as, on average, FSR releases move 
equity markets by more than 1% during the subsequent month. Another important finding 
is that FSRs also reduce noise, as market volatility tends to decline in response to FSRs. These 
effects are particularly strong if the FSR contains an optimistic assessment of the risks to 
financial stability, when FSRs are found to move equity markets upwards in up to two thirds 
of the cases. Speeches and interviews, in contrast, have only modest effects on stock market 
returns, and cannot reduce market volatility. 
However, the effects of FSRs and speeches crucially depend on market conditions and 
other factors. Importantly, during the financial crisis, FSRs were moving financial markets less 
than before the crisis, while speeches by governors did move financial markets. Finally, the 
results indicate that financial stability communication of central banks influences financial 
markets primarily via a coordination channel, i.e. it provides relevant information which 
exerts a significant and persistent effect on markets.
The paper shows that while the release schedule of FSRs is pre-scheduled, speeches 
and interviews are a much more flexible communication tool. For instance, their number is 
clearly positively correlated with financial market volatility. Given their flexibility, speeches 
and interviews by definition carry some surprise element. Since it is mostly at the discretion 
of the central bank governors whether or not to make statements about financial stability, 
the fact that a governor feels compelled to raise financial stability issues in a speech or an 
interview can therefore be an important additional news component. In contrast, due to 
the fixed release schedule for Financial Stability Reports, financial markets expect statements 
about financial stability issues on the release days. There might be surprising elements   
in their content, but the mere fact that the FSR is released does not come as a surprise. This 
difference might be at the heart of the different effects of the two instruments on market 
volatility. 
The empirical findings of the paper raise a number of policy issues. Communication 
on financial stability issues by a central bank has been and will likely be watched even 
more  closely  in  the  future,  and  thus  can  potentially  have  an  important  influence  on 
financial markets. Does this imply that central banks should limit transparency and their Introduction
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communication on certain financial stability issues, as argued by Cukierman (2009), or does 
this make the case for enhanced transparency and accountability, as argued by others? The 
findings of the paper underline that communication by monetary authorities on financial 
stability issues can indeed influence financial market developments. Yet the findings also 
show that such communication entails risks as they may unsettle markets. Hence central 
bank communication on financial stability issues needs to be employed with utmost care, 
stressing the difficulty of designing a successful communication strategy on these matters. 
The paper proceeds in section 2 by outlining a more general motivation and relating 
the current paper to the existing literature. Section 3 explains the dataset underlying the 
empirical analysis. In particular, it reports how the measures for central bank communication 
have been extracted and quantified. It also shows how the incidence and the content   
of the communications relate to the external environment, and presents the event study 
methodology that we employ. Section 4 discusses the empirical results and implications, 
and presents robustness tests. Section 5 concludes.Motivation and literature





Given the important role of monetary authorities for financial stability, corresponding 
central bank communication has always played an important role as a policy instrument, 
for mainly three reasons. First, financial markets are inherently characterized by asymmetric 
information and co-ordination problems, characteristics which lie at the heart of the potential 
risks to financial stability. To address these problems, transparency and communication are 
crucial. In particular, the central bank can be much more effective in promoting financial 
stability if it has established a reputation that its analysis and communication are of high 
quality. Accordingly, communication also serves the role of making the central bank credible. 
Finally, any body that is entrusted with financial stability tasks will need to be accountable, 
which calls for a clear mandate, and a transparent conduct of the assigned task. Although 
Oosterloo and de Haan (2004) found that there is often a lack of accountability requirements 
for central banks’ financial stability objectives, this is very likely to change in the future, once 
financial stability has become a more important and explicit objective of central banks. 
These aspects of communication for financial stability do therefore closely resemble 
the role of monetary policy-related communication, as established in the recent literature on 
central bank communication (see, e.g., Blinder et al. 2008, Gosselin et al. 2007, Ehrmann 
and Fratzscher 2007a). Also in the monetary policy sphere, communication serves i) to 
make central banks credible (mirroring the importance of financial stability communication 
for reputational purposes), ii) to enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy (just like 
good financial stability communication can contribute to financial stability), and iii) to make 
central banks accountable.
While being very similar along these three dimensions, there are also differences 
between  monetary  policy-related  and  financial  stability-related  communication.  Central 
banks have become much more transparent about their conduct of monetary policy over 
the last decades, along with an increasing importance given to communication. There is   
a debate on possible limits to central bank transparency (e.g., Mishkin 2004, Morris and 
Shin 2002, Svensson 2006), but the arguments are much more contentious than in the case 
of financial stability-related communication. As demonstrated by Cukierman (2009), a clear 
case for limiting transparency can be made when the central bank has private information 
about problems within segments of the financial system. Release of such information may 
potentially be harmful, e.g. by triggering a run on the financial system. This suggests that 
policy makers need to be even more careful when designing their communication strategy 
with regard to their financial stability objectives. 
While the literature on central bank communication for monetary policy purposes has 
been growing rapidly over the recent decade, the communication on financial stability has 
received considerably less attention. Svensson (2003) argues that through the publication of 
indicators of financial stability in FSRs, central banks can issue early warnings to economic 
agents,  thereby  ideally  preventing  financial  instability  from  materializing,  and  thereby 
ensuring that financial stability concerns do not impose a constraint on monetary policy. 
Cihak (2006, 2007) provides a systematic overview of FSRs as the main communication 
channel that central banks use for this purpose. He documents, on the one hand, that 
the  reports  have  become  considerably  more  sophisticated  over  time,  with  substantial 
improvements in the underlying analytical tools, and on the other hand, that there has been Motivation and literature
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a large increase in the number of central banks that publish FSRs. The frontrunners are the 
Bank of England, the Swedish Riksbank, and Norges Bank (Norway’s central bank), all of 
which started publication in 1996/1997. It is probably not a coincidence that these three 
central banks are typically also listed in the group of the most transparent central banks 
with regard to monetary policy issues (Eijffinger and Geraats 2006, Dincer and Eichengreen 
2009). In the meantime, around 50 central banks are now releasing FSRs. 
A first empirical analysis of FSRs has been conducted by Oosterloo et al. (2007), 
with the aim to understand who publishes FSRs, for what motives, and with what content. 
Their results indicate that there are mainly three motives for publication, namely to increase 
transparency, to contribute to financial stability, and to strengthen co-operation between 
different  authorities  with  financial  stability  tasks.  They  also  find  that  the  occurrence 
of a systemic banking crisis in the past is positively related to the likelihood that an FSR   
is published.
Even less work has been done with regard to the effects of financial stability-related 
communication. To our knowledge, the only exception is Allen et al. (2004), who conducted 
an external evaluation of the Riksbank’s work on financial stability issues, and came up 
with a number of recommendations, such as making the objective of the Riksbank’s FSRs 
explicit, providing the underlying data, or expanding the scope of the FSR to, e.g., the 
insurance sector. The present paper aims to fill this gap and analyzes how central bank 
communications about financial stability are received in financial markets.Measuring communication and the effects on financial markets




Measuring communication  
and the effects on financial markets
This section introduces the dataset that we develop to study the effects of financial 
stability-related  communication.  We  start  by  explaining  the  choice  of  data  frequency,   
the  sample  of  countries  and  time  that  we  use,  andthe  choice  of  the  financial  sector 
stock market indices as our measure for financial markets. Subsequently, we describe the 
process for identifying the relevant communications, how their content is coded, and the 
econometric methodology.
  
3.1  Choice  of  data  frequency,  data  sample  and  the  relevant  financial 
markets
We  are  interested  in  the  effects  of  financial  stability-related  communication  on 
financial markets. A first choice that is required relates to the frequency of the analysis. 
Given the speed of reactions in financial markets, it is necessary to identify the timing   
of the events as precisely as possible. Identification of a precise time stamp will allow for 
an analysis in a very tight time window around the event, thereby ensuring that the market 
reaction is not distorted by other news. We opted for a daily frequency for two practical 
reasons. First, given the aim to provide a cross-country study over a relatively long horizon, 
financial  market  data  are  not  consistently  available  at  higher  frequencies.  Second,  the 
identification of the precise days of the release of central bank communications has already 
not been trivial in many cases, whereas the identification of the exact time of the release 
within a day is largely impossible. While a higher frequency might have been desirable,   
it is important to note that the daily frequency is commonly employed in the announcements 
effect literature – for instance, two classic references with regard to the effect of monetary 
policy on stock markets, Rigobon and Sack (2004) as well as Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) 
both use daily data.
The sample of countries and the time period of the study have been determined on the 
basis of the release of FSRs. We tried to identify the release dates of the FSRs or relevant 
speeches or interviews by central bank governors for all those central banks listed in Cihak 
(2006, 2007), i.e. for all central banks which release FSRs. We succeeded to identify such 
release dates for 35 countries, 24 of which are advanced economies according to the IMF’s 
country classification. Additionally, we included the euro area, as well as the United States   
as the only country that does not release an FSR, restricting ourselves to studying the effect 
of speeches and interviews in this case. In total, our sample therefore covers 37 central 
banks (see Table 1). Our sample starts in 1996, i.e. the year when the first FSR was released 
by the Bank of England. The data were extracted in October 2009, such that the sample 
ends on September 30, 2009. 
As to the selection of a financial market that shall be subject of this study, we opted   
for stock market indices relating to the financial sector, as we expect that empirical effects 
of financial stability communication should be most easily detectable for this sector. Such 
data are available from Datastream back to 1996, i.e. to the start of our sample period, 
for all the countries in our sample. This choice is partially owed to the large cross-country Measuring communication and the effects on financial markets
N a t i o n a l   B a n k   o f   P o l a n d 12
3
dimension and the need to get historical data for nearly one and a half decades, which 
limited  the  availability  of  less  traditional  market  measures,  such  as  implied  volatilities   
or expected default frequencies (EDFs). While the link of these measures to financial stability 
would have been relatively direct, we hope that the financial sector stock indices (using MSCI 
indices) provide a measure that is reasonably closely related to financial stability issues, too. 
All stock indices are expressed in local currency, given that we are interested in the response 
of national financial markets to national communication. We will furthermore show that 
our results are robust to using the overall stock market indices, rather than focusing on   
the financial sector stocks alone.
3.2 Choice and identification of communication events
At the core of this paper is a measure of communication events that quantifies 
the  content  of  communication.  We  focus  on  the  two  most  important  channels  of   
communication about financial stability issues, namely FSRs and speeches and interviews. 
FSRs are typically relatively comprehensive documents that discuss various aspects of financial 
stability. They normally begin with an overall assessment of financial stability in the respective 
country, often including an international perspective. They usually contain an evaluation of 
current macroeconomic and financial market developments and the assessment of risks to 
banks and systemically relevant non-banking financial institutions. Cihak (2006) calls these 
sections the “core” part of an FSR and differentiates them from the “non-core” part that 
includes research articles on special issues, often written by outside experts. The weights 
attributed to these two parts vary considerably across central banks. The spectrum ranges 
from FSRs that only cover the core part (e.g. Norway) to FSRs which only consist of articles 
covering a special topic (e.g. France). Most central banks lie somewhere in between this 
range and are usually closer to the first type. Typically, FSRs are published twice a year, i.e. 
are relatively infrequent communications. 
A second important channel for central banks to communicate about financial stability 
issues is to give speeches and interviews. By their very nature, these are much more flexible 
than FSRs. Their timing can be chosen flexibly (Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007b, 2009) have 
shown this for monetary policy-related speeches), and their content can be much more 
focused. Of course, this is also due to the fact that they are much shorter than FSRs. 
As we are interested in testing the response of financial markets to central bank 
communication, we need to identify the release dates as a first step (recall that we will 
conduct the analysis at a daily frequency, hence there is no need to identify the timing 
within a given day – as long as the release takes place before markets close). As to FSRs,   
we  carefully  ensured  a  proper  identification  of  their  release  dates,  mainly  based   
on information provided on central banks’ websites and by central bank press offices, and 
complemented with information from news reports about the release of FSRs as recorded 
in Factiva, a database that contains newspaper articles and newswire reports from 14,000 
sources. As shown in Table 1, the dataset contains information on 367 FSRs. The increasing 
tendency of central banks to publish FSRs is reflected in this database. Starting from less 
than 10 FSRs per annum in the 1990s, we could identify around 50 FSRs each year in the 
mid 2000s (note that the drop in numbers in 2009 is entirely due to the fact that the sample 
ends in September, i.e. covers only three quarters of the year). As to the country coverage, 
the early publishers are obviously represented more frequently, with 20 and more reports, 
whereas “late movers” have far fewer observations, down to 1 for the case of the Bank 
of Greece, which published its first FSR in June 2009 (for Indonesia and the Philippines, 
we could not identify the release dates; note that dropping these two countries from   
the sample does not affect our results in any substantive way). Measuring communication and the effects on financial markets
WORKING PAPER No. 93 1
3
Table 1: Summary statistics for FSRs and speeches
Note: The table shows the number of FSRs and speeches that are contained in the database, by country and by year.Measuring communication and the effects on financial markets
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To identify speeches and interviews is more difficult. Our objective is to extract all 
relevant  public  statements  that  relate  to  financial  stability.  For  tractability  reasons,  we 
restricted our search to speeches by the central bank governor – even in cases where   
a central bank has a member of its governing body that has an explicit assignment regarding 
financial stability. We used Factiva and extracted all database entries containing the name 
of the policy maker together with some keywords that appear with certain regularity in the 
editorials of the FSRs.2 From all hits obtained, we extracted those containing statements by 
the relevant policy maker with a reference to financial stability issues. Since newswire reports 
typically record the precise time stamp, we were in a position to allocate the speeches and 
interviews to the appropriate trading days. Communications during weekends were allocated 
to the subsequent Monday, communications in the evening – such as dinner speeches –   
to the subsequent trading day. Furthermore, we very carefully chose only the first report   
about a given statement, which typically originated from a newswire service. This choice 
has the advantage that the reporting is very timely, usually comes within minutes of each 
statement, and that it is mostly descriptive without providing much analysis or interpretation. 
To avoid double counting, we discarded all subsequent reports or analysis of the same 
statement. 
A number of issues are worth noting about this data extraction exercise. First, the 
search was conducted only in English language. We might therefore not have discovered   
all  statements,  if  these  were  made  and  reported  upon  exclusively  in  other  languages. 
However, due to the fact that Factiva contains also newswire reports and due to the extensive 
coverage of this topic by newswires, this issue should not be very problematic. 
Second,  one  can  easily  think  of  other  keywords  to  use  in  the  database  search.   
We have experimented with larger sets, e.g. including also the terms “volatile”, “volatility”, 
“risk”, “adverse” or “pressures”. However, the additional hits typically related to monetary 
policy  communications  (such  as  central  bank  governors  talking  about  inflationary 
“pressures”,  “risks”  to  price  stability,  etc.),  such  that  the  resulting  dataset  on  financial 
stability communications was basically unaltered. 
Third, the news sources might be selective in their reporting, thus possibly not covering 
all relevant statements. However, given the sensitivity of the topic and the importance 
that it has for financial markets, we are confident that the coverage is close to complete. 
Furthermore,  as  we  are  interested  in  testing  the  market  response  to  communication,   
it makes sense to focus only on those statements that actually reach market participants, 
and this is best achieved by looking at prominent newswire services. 
Fourth, our news sources may wrongly report or misinterpret a statement by policy 
makers. Again, our objective is to assess communication from the perspective of financial 
markets and therefore we analyze the information market participants actually receive. 
The resulting dataset contains 768 communication. The breakdown by year in Table 
1 reveals large time variations, with a massive increase in the number of speeches in 1998, 
i.e. during the Asian and the Russian crisis, as well as during the financial crisis of 2007-
2010. This suggests that the occurrence of speeches and interviews is responsive to the 
prevailing circumstances, which is in stark contrast to FSRs, which are typically released   
at pre-specified dates. Speeches and interviews do therefore provide the central bank with 
a very flexible instrument to communicate financial stability concerns, as their timing can 
be chosen flexibly. 
2 To be precise, we used the following search terms: “financial stability or systemic or systemically or crisis   
or instability or instabilities or unstable or fragile or fragility or fragilities or banking system or disruptive or   
imbalances or vulnerable or strains”. Measuring communication and the effects on financial markets
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Figure 1 provides a first graphical check of the relation between financial markets and 
the frequency of financial-stability related speeches and interviews, by plotting their total 
number in all countries in a given quarter on the right-hand axis, and the standard deviation 
of daily returns of the global financial stock index in each quarter on the left-hand axis. 
The evolution of the two lines is extremely close, clearly suggesting that communication 
intensifies in times of financial market turbulence. 














Notes:  The figure shows the total number of speeches and interviews in all countries in a given quarter on the right-hand axis   
(solid line), and the standard deviation of daily returns of the global financial stock index in each quarter on the left-hand 
axis (dashed line).
The results of a more formal test are provided in Table 2. The table calculates the 
cumulated stock market returns and the standard deviation of daily stock market returns 
preceding the communication events, and compares them to equivalent figures for non-
event days (with tests for statistically significant differences given in the columns denoted 
by “Diff”). The left part of the table contains the results for FSRs, the right part for speeches 
and interviews. The different rows of the table relate to different time windows prior to 
the event, with the first row measuring returns on the day prior to the event, the second 
row on the 2 days prior to the event, and so on. Standard deviations are calculated for 
time  windows  exceeding  3  days.  The  non-event  comparison  figures  are  calculated  for   
a sample where no communication event has occurred in the preceding 60 business days, 
and no communication event follows in the subsequent 60 business days. The sample   
is furthermore restricted to non-overlapping observations. 
The picture that resulted from Figure 1, i.e. that the occurrence of speeches and 
interviews is closely related to stock market volatility, is confirmed in the very last set of 
columns in Table 2: on days before an event (“event days”), volatility is substantially higher 
than on non-event days, with the difference being statistically significant at the 1% level 
throughout all time windows considered. This is in contrast to the results for the FSRs, the 
publication schedules of which, as we know, are pre-determined. Even though there are 
some time windows where the volatility is statistically significantly different, the results are 
far less consistent. Furthermore, if anything, market volatility tends to be lower on event 
days than on non-event days, a pattern which is most likely driven by the fact that most 
central banks started to release their FSRs in the early 2000s, when market volatility was 
comparatively low.Measuring communication and the effects on financial markets
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A similar comparison for the stock market returns also reveals that communication 
by central banks intensifies during periods of stock market declines. Whereas the average 
stock return prior to non-event days is typically positive, it is on average negative prior 
to speeches and interviews, and differences are statistically significant at the 1% level, 
regardless of the time window. No such pattern is visible for FSRs. The main conclusion from 
this analysis therefore is that while the release schedule of FSRs is pre-defined, speeches and 
interviews are a much more flexible communication tool, and react to the current market 
environment.
In the light of these findings, one might ask whether speeches and their content are 
predictable, such that financial markets might have priced in the effects already prior to the 
communication event. In such a case, the subsequent event study methodology would not 
be appropriate. However, it is important to note that while speeches and interviews occur 
more frequently in times of high market volatility and declining stock markets, this does 
not imply any predictability of speeches or their content. Probit models including measures 
of stock market misalignment, the market trend and its volatility (either directly or their 
absolute values), do a poor job in predicting the events: the 99th percentile of the predicted 
probabilities of the events is smaller than 0.025.
 . Measuring the content of communications
Once we have identified the communication events, it is necessary to measure their 
content in order to make the data amenable to econometric analysis. In other words,   
we want to capture those dimensions and elements of FSRs and speeches/interviews which 
are relevant for financial market participants and thus will be reflected in asset prices. 
A  discussion  of  the  various  possibilities  of  achieving  this  is  provided  in  Blinder   
et al. (2008). The simplest option consists of assigning a dummy variable that is equal 
to one on event days, and to zero otherwise. While easily done, this approach limits the 
analysis severely, namely to a study whether communication affects volatility or absolute 
returns. If we are interested in the effect of the content of communication, a method 
for quantification of such content is required. The approach adopted in some part of the 
literature on monetary policy-related communication, namely to read the communications 
and code them on various scales, was not feasible for our purposes, given the amount of 
text that needed to be quantified. We have therefore opted for an automated approach for 
the current paper.3 
We  employed  the  computerized  textual-analysis  software  DICTION  5.0,4  which 
searches text for different semantic features by using a corpus of several thousand words, 
and scores the text along an optimism dimension. This dimension may be important as   
it  provides  agents  with  information  about  the  current  state  and  the  prospects  of  the   
financial system and underlying risks. The respective scores are computed by adding the 
standardized  word  frequencies  of  various  subcategories  labelled  as  optimistic,  and  by   
subtracting the corresponding frequencies of pessimistic subcategories. In broad terms, 
optimism  refers  to  “language  endorsing  some  person,  group,  concept  or  event,  or 
highlighting their positive entailments.”
This software has been used extensively in communication sciences and in political 
sciences, e.g. to analyze speeches of politicians (Hart 2000, Hart and Jarvis 1997), but has 
3  An alternative approach is used by Lucca and Trebbi (2009), where FOMC statements are cut down into 
small segments of text, the semantic orientation of which is then calculated by checking how often these text   
segments appear in conjunction with the words dovish or hawkish in a large body of text.
4 See http://www.dictionsoftware.com.Measuring communication and the effects on financial markets
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also been applied in the context of central banks (Bligh and Hess 2007, Armesto et al. 
2009). Furthermore, Davis et al. (2006) have used it to measure the reaction of financial 
markets to earnings announcements, and find a significant incremental market response   
to optimistic and pessimistic language usage in earnings press releases.
There are a number of advantages of this approach over human coding of the text. 
First, the software creates a coding that is more mechanical and thus objective, compared 
to human coding which tends to be more judgmental. While some subjectivity could arise 
due to the choice of the content of the dictionaries against which a text is assessed, it   
is important to note that the corpus has been defined based on linguistic theory and without 
an active participation by the authors of this paper. Another advantage is the replicability 
of the coding, which is in stark contrast to human coding, and also allows more text   
to be added without distorting the scoring process. Third, the automated approach allows   
a consistent coding of long passages of text, and across a large number of communications. 
Human  coding  of  long  texts  with  various  points  is  rather  difficult,  as  no  part  should   
in principle be given a larger weight in the assessment. Given the breadth of FSRs, this 
issue is particularly severe in the current application. At the same time, a drawback of the 
automated approach is that it does not consider the context of the text, and thus cannot 
generate a “tailor-made” coding for financial stability-related communication. 
Based on this computerized textual-analysis software, we computed a score for each 
individual speech or interview (note that, effectively, we are coding the content of the 
related news reports, rather than the original source text), and for the overview part of each 
FSR.5 Subsequently, we transformed the resulting scores into a discrete variable, which takes 
the value of -1 for the lowest third of the distribution, a value of 0 for the middle part of 
the distribution, and the value of +1 for the upper third of the distribution. That is, a value 
of +1 denotes a relatively optimistic text, while a value of -1 corresponds to a relatively 
pessimistic statement. The discretization of scores is required for the subsequent analysis, 
where we are interested in the market effects of optimistic vs. pessimistic communication, 
rather than the effect of an incremental change in tone. This transformation was applied 
for the speeches as well as for the FSRs. Note that we will test for robustness using a very 
different measurement approach, which also attempts to capture the surprise component 
contained in the respective communications, as well as (for the parts of the subsequent 
analysis where a discretization is not required) using the raw optimism scores given by the 
software. 
It is important to note that this implies a relative coding, i.e. a given communication 
is scored in a comparative fashion against the other texts in the sample. However, due to 
the large sample, both across countries and along the time dimension, our communications 
cover periods of relative stability and tranquillity, as well as periods of financial market crises 
or turbulence. Accordingly, the overall sample of text should be relatively balanced, such 
that text which is coded with plus or minus one should indeed represent a corresponding 
opinion. We denote the resulting indicators by I it
optimism, FSR and I it
optimism, speech, respectively,   
where i denotes a given country, and t stands for time. In the appendix, we provide a 
number of examples of speeches and interviews, and how they were coded.
  
5 While this overview carries different names across central banks, e.g. editorial, introductory chapter, executive 
summary, etc., it is rather similar in nature for all FSRs.Measuring communication and the effects on financial markets
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 .4 The event study methodology
What are the effects of FSRs and speeches/interviews on financial markets? The natural 
econometric approach to test our hypotheses of interest is the event study methodology. 
We use this methodology because we are interested not only in the contemporaneous effect 
of financial stability statements, but we also want to know how persistent the effect is over 
time. We can define the release of an FSR, or the delivery of a speech or an interview as an 
event. The question we want to address is whether the event affects stock markets in a causal 
fashion. For that purpose, it is essential that we can compare the stock market evolution 
following the event to the counterfactual, i.e. a predicted value that we believe would have 
occurred had the event not happened. A crucial issue in any event study is therefore to find 
a benchmark model to calculate expected returns, which in turn allows calculation of excess 
returns.6 Most event studies look at the effect of events, such as earnings announcements 
or stock splits, on individual stocks, and use some variant of a factor model, such as the 
Fama–French (1993) three-factor model, or the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, which 
extends the previous model by a momentum factor. 
Given that we are interested in the evolution of national stock market indices rather 
than of individual stocks, the book-to-market ratio and the size factor of the Fama–French 
model are not applicable. Following Edmans et al. (2007) and Pojarliev and Levich (2007), 
we start by defining normal returns as:
(1)
it it i it i it i t i
mt i mt i mt i it i i it
M S T D
R R R R R
ε γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ γ
+ + + + +
+ + + + =
− − −
+ − −
1 8 1 7 1 6 5
1 4 3 1 2 1 1 0
where Rit is the daily local currency return on the financial sector stock market index 
for country i on day t, Rmt is the daily US dollar return on Datastream’s global financial 
sector stock market index, and Dt denotes dummy variables for Monday through Thursday. 
Tit-1 stands for the trend in stock markets over the 20 days prior to the event, Sit-1 for the 
standard deviation of daily stock market returns over the 20 days prior to the event, and 
Mit-1 for the “misalignment” of stock indices on the day preceding the event, measured as 
the percentage deviation of the stock indices from their national average over the entire 
sample period. 
The first 5 factors follow Edmans et al. (2007). The lagged index return controls for 
possible first-order serial correlation. The global stock market index is meant to capture the 
effects of international stock market integration, and since some indices might be lagging 
or leading the world index, Edmans et al. (2007) not only include the contemporaneous 
global returns, but furthermore a lead and a lag. The last three terms are owed to earlier 
event studies on exchange rates such as Pojarliev and Levich (2007) or Fratzscher (2009). The 
trend factor attempts to allow for persistence in stock market movements, and is therefore 
closely related to the momentum factor in the Carhart four-factor model. The inclusion 
of the standard deviation is an attempt to capture the effect of market volatility. Finally, 
the misalignment factor is based on the idea that there might be booms or busts in stock 
markets, and that over a sufficiently long sample, there could be some mean reversion 
(albeit possibly allowing for a drift). We test for robustness to the exclusion of these last 
three terms, given that they are derived from the exchange rate literature rather than the 
stock market event studies, and find our results to be qualitatively unaltered.
6 For overviews of the event study literature see, e.g., MacKinlay (1997) or Kothari and Warner (2007).Measuring communication and the effects on financial markets
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Model (1) is estimated country by country, only including days that were neither 
preceding nor preceded by communication events for 60 days (in each direction). Based   
on the estimated parameters (denoted by hats), it is then possible to calculate excess returns 
on event days as 
(2)
) ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ˆ
1 8 1 7 1 6 5
1 4 3 1 2 1 1 0
− − −
+ − −
+ + + +
+ + + + − =
it i it i it i t i
mt i mt i mt i it i i it it
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γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ γ ε
The  hypothesis  to  be  tested  is  whether  communication  leads  to  excess  returns   
in the expected direction, i.e. whether
(3) 1 0 ˆ
, = >
c optimism
it it I if ε   1 0 ˆ
, − = <
c optimism
it it I if ε   or
 
where the superscript c stands for the two communication types, FSR and speeches 
or interviews. A more complex approach is required if we want to calculate the longer-term 
effects of communication beyond the event day. While we assume that world markets are 
exogenous to a communication in an individual country also over extended time windows, 
this is obviously not the case for the own lag, the recent trend, standard deviation and 
misalignment: as of the second day, it is necessary to calculate predicted returns for the 
preceding day, and to plug these into equation (2), thus yielding  
(4)
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Note that compared to equation (2), Rit-1, Tit-1, Sit-1 and Mit-1 have all been replaced 
by their predicted value in the absence of a communication event. For k=0, the two coincide, 
whereas for all days k>0, it is important to calculate the appropriate predicted values. Tests 
for the effects of communication over longer time horizons with a time window of K days 
then amount to asking whether 
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Following  common  practice  in  the  event  study  literature,  we  employ  two  types   
of tests for the effects of communications (both described in detail in MacKinlay, 1997). 
First, we apply a non-parametric sign test to study whether the above conditions hold   
in more than 50% of all cases. The underlying idea is that by construction – if the factor 
model is correct – excess returns and cumulated excess returns are on average zero, and 
that it is equally probable that they are positive or negative. If the events systematically move 
stock markets in the expected direction, we should find that the excess returns are non-zero, 
and of the expected sign, in significantly more than 50% of cases. The second (parametric) 
test checks the average size of the (cumulated) excess returns, and tests these against the 
null hypothesis that they are zero.Measuring communication and the effects on financial markets
WORKING PAPER No. 93 21
3
In a similar vein, to test whether communications reduce noise, i.e. lower stock market 
volatility, we furthermore test whether 
(6) 1
1 / 1 , / , ˆ ˆ = <
− − − +
c
it D if
k t t i k t t i ε ε σ σ  
   
with  σε ˆi,t/t+k  the  standard  deviation  of  daily  excess  returns  in  country  i  from   
time  t  to  t+k  ,  σ
ε ˆi,t-1/t-1-k    their  standard  deviation  over  the  k  days  prior  to  the   
event,  and  D
c
it    a  dummy  variable  that  is  equal  to  one  on  the  days  when   
a  communication  of  type  c  is  released  in  country  i.7  Also  here,  we  apply  the 
non-parametric  sign  test  whether  the  above  conditions  hold  in  more  than  50%   
of  all  cases  and  the  test  whether  the  difference  of  the  two  standard  deviations   
is equal to zero.
7 Excluding the daily excess returns on day t from calculating the post-event standard deviations does not   
alter our results. This implies that the results are not driven by the initial market reaction on the day of the 
announcement. The effects on financial stability-related communication




The effects of financial stability-related communication
This section starts by providing some stylized facts of how the content of FSRs and 
speeches  evolved  over  time  –  and  to  what  extent  it  managed  to  be  forward-looking  and 
identify  risks  and  vulnerabilities  rather  than  reflect  market  developments  (section  4.1).   
It  then  proceeds  by  identifying  and  testing  for  the  effects  of  communication  on  financial   
markets (section 4.2) and presents a number of sample splits and robustness tests that also 
sheds further light on the channels trough which communication affects markets (section 4.3)
4 .1 Stylized facts about timing and content of communication
How did the content of FSRs and speeches evolve over time and across countries? 
And  to  what  extent  was  such  communication  forward-looking  rather  than  reflecting 
market developments? Figure 2 provides an overview of how the optimism expressed in 
FSRs (upper panel) as well as speeches and interviews (lower panel) has evolved over time.   
It plots, for each year, the average and median optimism for the respective communication 
events, as well as the 25th and the 75th percentiles. Note that the figure for FSRs starts only   
in 1999, given that in the years before, there were too few FSRs being published to provide 
a meaningful picture.
A number of interesting issues emerge from this figure. Most importantly, it is striking 
that  the  tone  of  FSRs  had  continuously  become  more  optimistic  after  2000,  reaching   
a peak in early 2006. This suggests that FSRs contain commentaries on the current market 
environment, but that they are also forward-looking, with some anticipation of the 2007-
2010 crisis. However, there is a relatively large heterogeneity across countries, as shown 
by the breadth of the scores encompassed by the 25th and the 75th percentiles. This is 
especially the case for speeches and interviews, which do not seem to follow any obvious 
pattern over time.8
Table 3 looks further into the question to what extent the content of communications 
reflects previous financial market developments, and reports corresponding test results. 
Separately for FSRs and speeches and interviews, it reports the average return and standard 
deviation of financial sector stock indices over the usual time windows (from one day   
to 60 days prior to the event), separately for communications coded as -1, 0 and +1 on   
the optimism scale in columns (1), (2) and (3), respectively. The statistical significance of   
a test for equality is provided for each pair, i.e. (1) vs. (2), (1) vs. (3), and (2) vs. (3). 
The results show that the content of FSRs reflects to some extent prior financial 
market developments. There is a monotonic relation between the tone of FSRs and the 
preceding stock market returns: the more optimistic the FSR, the larger have been the 
preceding  returns.  However,  these  differences  are  typically  not  statistically  significant.   
At the same time, pessimistic FSRs (i.e. those coded with -1) have, on average, been preceded 
by considerably larger stock market volatility than neutral or positive FSRs, regardless of the 
length of the time window, with the differences being highly statistically significant. 
8 Note that the raw scores cannot be read as direct indications of optimism, as it is not the case that scores   
below 50 would represent pessimistic text. The interpretation of the scores should be made relative to a lar-
ge number of texts within the same category.The effects on financial stability-related communication
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25th percentline 75th percentline
2005 2010
Panel B: Speeches and interviews
Notes: The figure plots the average, median, 25th and 75th percentiles of the optimism scores for FSRs (Panel A) and speeches 
and interviews (Panel B) in any given year. 
Interestingly, no such relations are identifiable for speeches and interviews: there   
is not a single case where stock market volatility or returns would be related to the content 
of speeches in a statistically significant manner. If anything, it seems to be the case that 
there is quite some “leaning against the wind”: the returns preceding optimistic speeches 
are  consistently  lower  than  the  returns  preceding  pessimistic  ones,  suggesting  that   
a positive picture is given especially in cases of bad stock market performance.The effects on financial stability-related communication
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4 .2 Effects of FSRs and speeches/interviews
We now turn to the question to what extent central bank communication was affecting 
financial markets. A first test is provided in Figure 3, which compares the actual evolution 
of stock markets following communication events to the predicted evolution on the basis of 
the benchmark model (1). The upper panel reports the results for the FSRs, the lower panel 
those for speeches and interviews. The solid line plots the average actual cumulated returns 
over 60 days following the communication events. The dashed line, in contrast, shows the 
expected cumulated returns that would result from the benchmark model in the absence 
of a communication event. To combine pessimistic as well as optimistic communications 
in one chart, the cumulated returns are multiplied by -1 for pessimistic communications, 
whereas they are left unchanged for optimistic communications. Accordingly, we would 
expect the actual returns to lie above the predicted returns after statements if the markets 
follow the point of view expressed by the central bank (i.e. we observe negative excess 
returns in response to pessimistic statements, and positive ones in the case of optimistic 
communications).
The  figure  provides  a  compelling  picture  about  the  effects  of  central  bank 
communication. The upper panel for FSRs shows that markets move in the direction of the 
central bank view, since the actual returns are substantially larger than the predicted returns. 
Moreover, the effect is quite sizeable economically: for several time windows, FSR releases 
move equity markets on average by more than 1% in the direction indicated by the FSRs. 
Interestingly, expected cumulated returns in this case are relatively close to zero, 
suggesting the predictions of the benchmark model are close to those of a random walk 
model. In other words, due to the fact that the release pattern of FSRs is not systematically 
related to the previous stock market performance, the benchmark model has a hard time in 
predicting the subsequent returns.
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Notes:  The figure compares the actual evolution of cumulated stock market returns (in %) following communication events to the 
predicted evolution on the basis of the benchmark model (1). The upper panel reports the results for the FSRs, the lower 
panel those for speeches and interviews. The solid line plots the average actual cumulated returns starting from day 1 after 
the communication event and up to day 60. The dashed line shows the expected cumulated returns that would result from 
the benchmark model in the absence of a communication event. The cumulated returns are multiplied by -1 for pessimistic 
communications, whereas they are left unchanged for optimistic communications.
 
Looking at the lower panel of Figure 3, the findings are remarkably different for 
speeches and interviews. As we have seen above, speeches and interviews typically follow 
stock market declines, and the model clearly predicts further declines subsequently (the 
dashed line in the figure). As a matter of fact, actual returns do on average decline after 
a speech or an interview; however, comparing the expected with the actual evolution,   
it is also apparent that the stock markets decline by less than expected in the presence 
of central bank communications. The difference between predicted and actual cumulated 
returns is substantially smaller than for FSRs, however.
The figure also suggests that central bank communications are potentially affecting 
financial  markets  even  at  very  long  horizons,  given  that  the  gap  between  predicted   
and actual cumulated returns is present for the entire horizon of time windows we look at, 
and begins to narrow only towards the end of the horizon.
The formal test results for the effects of central bank communication are provided in 
Tables 4 and 5, covering FSRs and speeches and interviews, respectively. The first set of results 
relates to equation (5), i.e. tests whether optimistic statements yield positive excess returns, 
and pessimistic ones lead to negative excess returns. The first column shows the share   
of cases in which the condition was met, as well as the results of the non-parametric sign 
test. Shares above 0.5 would suggest that stock markets move in the direction of the content 
of communications. The statistical significance is assessed by stars (*** for 1%, ** for 5%, 
and * for 10% significance) – whereas numbers that are significantly smaller than 0.5   
would be characterized by apostrophes (’’’ for 1%, ’’ for 5%, and ’ for 10% significance). 
There is clear evidence that the views represented in FSRs get reflected in financial 
markets, in significantly more than 50% of all cases. In terms of magnitudes, which are 
reported in the second column, FSRs generate excess returns on the day of the release   
of 0.27% on average, and cumulated excess returns up to 1.6% in the longer run, with   
the largest effects found after 25 to 50 trading days, i.e. after 5 to 10 weeks. Such an effect 
is indeed sizeable and economically meaningful, in particular when considering that FSRs 
are generally released twice a year per country.The effects on financial stability-related communication
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How are these effects generated? Table 4 also provides a breakdown according to the 
type of the FSR, and reveals that in particular optimistic FSRs affect financial markets. They 
typically generate positive excess returns, which are furthermore large in magnitude, thus 
leading to statistically significant estimates. The cumulated excess returns are largest after 
55 days, amounting to more than 3%. This suggests that an optimistic assessment provided 
in FSRs leads to an improvement in stock market sentiment over a fairly long horizon,   
in a way that is not matched by pessimistic FSRs leading to a deterioration in sentiment. 
Table 4 also provides the results for tests whether the release of FSRs lowers stock 
market volatility, i.e. tests whether condition (6) holds, again using both the non-parametric 
sign test and the parametric test. There is compelling evidence that FSRs do indeed lead   
to a significant reduction in market volatility. 
Moving on to the effect of speeches as reported in Table 5, a rather different picture 
emerges. The effect on returns is less systematic than for FSRs. With some delay, optimistic 
speeches generate positive excess returns. The effect for pessimistic speeches on returns is, 
on average, non-existent, however. Of course, this is not to say that no speech would ever 
exert reactions on financial markets – rather, on average, there seems to be very little effect. 
At the same time, speeches do not lower stock market volatility – if anything, there is some 
tendency, especially of optimistic speeches, to somewhat increase it. This suggests that 
financial stability-related speeches are less able to reduce noise.
To  summarize,  these  findings  suggest,  first,  that  communication  about  financial 
stability has the potential to affect financial markets. FSRs exert very different effects than 
speeches and interviews: The views expressed in FSRs get reflected in stock market returns, 
and in a long-lasting fashion, in particular if the FSR contains an optimistic assessment 
of the risks to financial stability. FSRs also manage to reduce market volatility somewhat. 
Speeches and interviews, in contrast, only modestly affect market directions, and do leave 
market volatility mainly unaffected. An assessment of the effects of these tools therefore 
needs to clearly distinguish between the two.
4 . Sample splits and robustness
We have subjected our benchmark results to a number of sample splits and robustness 
tests,  which  we  will  describe  now.  There  are  basically  four  dimensions  to  these  tests. 
The first analyzes whether the breadth of the underlying panel dataset masks important 
heterogeneity, and we test for robustness by introducing various sample splits. The second 
is concerned with speeches and interviews in particular, and tests whether their effects 
are different if they are clustered. Third, we test whether our focus on financial stocks   
is important, or whether the results are robust to using the entire stock market indices. 
Fourth, we ask whether the split into optimistic and pessimistic content determines our 
results by providing an alternative way of identifying the content of communication, and 
by using the raw scores as generated by Diction. All results are provided in Tables 6 and 7, 
with FSRs being covered in Table 6, and speeches and interviews in Table 7. Given the large 
number of tests, we only show results for a time window of 25 business days. 
The first set of results relates to various sample splits. Given the large number of 
countries and the long time sample, it might be the case that there is substantial heterogeneity 
across countries or over time that we do not capture in the full sample. The first such split 
addresses possible cross-country heterogeneity, by re-running the estimation separately for 
all advanced and all emerging economies (following the IMF’s country classification). Results 
are overall robust. The interesting insight, though, is that there is a reduction in volatility 
following FSRs by central banks in advanced countries, whereas the main effects on returns 
originate in emerging countries. The effects on financial stability-related communication
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Also the second split along the time dimension reveals interesting patterns. Separate 
tests for the period prior to the financial crisis 2007-2010 (defining the starting date in 
September 2007, i.e. with Northern Rock; defining the start of the crisis with Lehman does 
not affect our results) and the time of the crisis shows that FSRs have exerted no systematic 
effect on stock markets during the crisis, whereas the effects of speeches and interviews are 
precisely driven by the period of the crisis, underlining that speeches and interviews may be 
much more influential during periods of financial stress.
The third sample split intends to identify whether the role of the central bank in 
financial supervision matters, by testing once for the effects of communication by central 
banks that do have a formal role in financial supervision, and once for those central banks 
without such a task. The classification is based on the CBFA index developed in Masciandaro 
and Quintyn (2009).9 This differentiation does not seem to play an important role, given that 
the results are robust, and no major differences overall between the two groups emerge.
Table 7 shows furthermore whether there are differences if speeches and interviews 
are clustered, i.e. the central bank governor might give a sequence of speeches or interviews 
in a relatively short time window. Such a sequence might be inherently different from one 
isolated event. We define a communication event to be part of a cluster if other speeches 
or interviews occur within 60 days after the event, or have occurred within 60 days before 
the event. As a matter of fact, these types exert very different effects. Speeches that are 
part of a cluster are not influencing the market view, and tend to increase market volatility.   
This is in sharp contrast to the stand-alone speeches, which create news, i.e. move markets 
along with the views expressed, and tend to do so largely without changing volatility.
The rows of section C in Tables 6 and 7 present additional robustness tests. First, 
replacing the financial sector stock indices with the broad national stock market index,   
we can test whether our results apply more broadly, or are confined to the financial sector. 
The results are remarkably robust. Furthermore, results are also not sensitive to the precise 
way we had split the communications into optimistic and pessimistic content. To test for 
this, we take two routes: First, by defining an alternative approach to discretizing the codes 
that attempts to control for the expected component contained in the communication, 
and to construct a surprise measure instead. We do so by means of the following auxiliary 
regression:
(7) it it it it q i
c optimism
it M S T C µ α α α α α + + + + + = − − − 1 4 1 3 1 2 1 0
,
where C it
optimism,cdenotes the raw Diction coding of a given communication of type c along 
the optimism dimension, and α0i and α1q are country fixed effects and time fixed effects for 
each quarter of the sample, respectively. The country fixed effects allow for the possibility 
that there is a different style in the reporting, thus leading to a different mean coding for 
each country. Such differences should be well known to observers, and therefore not be   
a surprise. The time fixed effects control for a common evolution across countries, given that 
often developments in financial markets are internationally determined. Such common time 
patterns should also not come as a surprise to financial markets. The last three explanatory 
factors are as described in benchmark model (1), i.e. they control for the trend, for stock 
market volatility, and for a possible stock market misalignment. We retrieve the residuals  ˆ µit 
from these regressions, and define a communication to be optimistic if ˆ µit is above the 66th 
percentile in the distribution, as pessimistic if it is below the 33rd percentile, and as neutral 
9 This index takes the value 1 if the central bank is not assigned the main responsibility for banking supervision; 
2 if the central bank has the main (or sole) responsibility for banking supervision; 3 if the central bank has   
furthermore responsibility for either insurances or the securities markets; 4 if the central bank has respon-
sibility in all three sectors. We allocate central banks to the group with supervisory functions if their index   
value is larger than one.The effects on financial stability-related communication
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otherwise. Even though this classification is very different from the original, unconditional, 
one, it turns out that the results are remarkably robust. Our second test for the role of 
our discretization method reverts to the original, raw, scores generated by Diction. Higher 
scores denote more optimistic communications, such that we would expect stock returns to 
increase correspondingly. This is indeed what we find, consistently with our earlier results: 
both FSRs and speeches exert some effects, with those of FSRs being substantially larger 
than those of speeches. With this measure, we are of course not able to separate out 
optimistic and pessimistic communications, such that we are neither able to conduct the 
non-parametric test, nor to fill the tables where we break down the results by the content 
of the communication.
The final point we address here is the question through which channel communication 
affects  financial  markets.  Is  it  that  communication  affects  markets  because  it  contains 
relevant information, and thus coordinates markets and functions as a focal point – akin to 
what is known as a coordination channel (e.g. Sarno and Taylor 2001, Fratzscher 2008)? Or 
is it that market participants believe that financial stability communication has a bearing on 
monetary policy decisions by central banks – or what is referred to as a signalling channel? 
The evidence discussed so far, in particular the persistence of the effects of communication, 
strongly points towards the coordination channel being at work (see Sarno and Taylor 2001). 
Yet a more direct test of these two channels is to ask whether financial market participants 
perceive  that  financial  stability  communication  by  central  banks  could  be  followed  by 
monetary policy decisions, which should imply that market interest rates are reactive to 
such communications. As can be seen in the bottom panels of Tables 6 and 7, it is clear that 
there is no systematic reaction of short (3-month) or long (5 to 10 year) interest rates. Thus, 
this is further evidence suggesting that there is very little role for a signalling channel, but 
that it is rather the coordination channel that is at work.
To summarize, the findings suggest that the effects of communication are not universal. 
Market conditions seem to matter, with different effects during the financial crisis. The 
origin of the communication also is important, with central banks in advanced economies 
exerting different effects from those in emerging economies. A sequence of speeches and 
interviews seems to be affecting stock markets less than an isolated communication by the 
central bank governor. But importantly, speeches and interviews were moving stock returns 
during the crisis, while they were not in the pre-crisis period. Finally, the evidence here 
further supports the conclusion that it is mainly a coordination channel that is at work – i.e. 
that communication provides relevant information about financial stability itself, rather than 
giving a signal about monetary policy, thereby affecting financial markets.
 Conclusions





This  paper  has  provided  an  empirical  assessment  of  the  effects  of  central  bank 
communication  about  financial  stability,  a  topic  that  has  remained  almost  entirely 
unexplored in the literature to date. The paper has studied the impact of central bank 
statements on financial markets, arguably one of the most important target groups of this 
type of communication. In more detail, it has constructed a unique dataset covering over 
1000 communication events (a third of which being FSRs, and two thirds being speeches 
and interviews by central bank governors) by 37 central banks over a time period from 1996 
to 2009, i.e. spanning nearly one and a half decades, and analyzed the reaction of financial 
sector stocks to these events. The emphasis of the paper has been to identify whether 
financial stability-related communication “creates news” and/or “reduces noise”. 
The  paper’s  findings  suggest  that  communication  about  financial  stability  has 
important repercussions on financial sector stock prices. However, there are clear differences 
between FSRs on the one hand and speeches and interviews on the other. FSRs clearly create 
news in the sense that the views expressed in FSRs get reflected in stock market returns. 
These effects are furthermore long-lasting. They also reduce noise, as market volatility tends 
to decline in response to FSRs. These effects are particularly strong if FSRs contain optimistic 
assessments  of  the  risks  to  financial  stability.  Speeches  and  interviews,  in  contrast,  do   
on average move financial markets far less. In particular, while having only modest effects   
on  stock  market  returns,  they  do  not  reduce  market  volatility.  However,  speeches  and 
interviews  were  affecting  market  returns  significantly  more  during  the  2007-10  global 
financial  crisis,  indicating  the  potential  importance  of  this  communication  tool  during 
periods of financial stress. 
The mechanism by which the central bank affects financial markets seems to be related 
to the notion of a co-ordination channel, whereby communication by the central bank works 
as a co-ordination device, thereby reducing heterogeneity in expectations and information, 
and thus inducing asset prices to more closely reflect the underlying fundamentals (Sarno 
and Taylor 2001). This conclusion is based on the finding that statements have longer-
lasting effects, which seems to imply that they have the potential to change the dynamics in 
financial markets, and based on the result that central bank communication about financial 
stability does not affect market interest rates in a systematic fashion. 
The paper has also demonstrated how flexibly speeches and interviews can be used 
as a communication tool, with a higher frequency in times of heightened financial market 
volatility. In contrast to FSRs with their pre-defined release schedules, the mere occurrence 
of a speech or an interview can constitute news to financial markets in itself, a fundamental 
difference that might explain why the two communication channels have so different effects 
on market volatility. The findings of the paper therefore underline that communication   
by  monetary  authorities  on  financial  stability  issues  can  influence  financial  market 
developments, but that it needs to be employed with utmost care, stressing the difficulty   
of designing a successful communication strategy on financial stability.
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Appendix: Examples of speeches 
and interviews and their coding
05 March 1996: “Brazil Central Bk President Denies Bank Sector Instability”
“Central bank President Gustavo Loyola Tuesday denied rumors of instability in Brazil’s 
banking sector and said increasing bank investigations and encouragement for bank mergers 
have quelched any possibility of a crisis […]” Source: Dow Jones International News
Coded: Optimism =1
27 October 1997: “China c.banker sees more small bank bankruptcies..”
“Some smaller Chinese banks and credit cooperatives could sink into bankruptcy due to bad 
loans, although a banking crisis was unlikely, central bank governor Dai Xianglong has said.” 
Source: Reuters News
Coded: Optimism =-1 
28 January 1998: “U.K. BOE’s George Confident Asia Contagion Can Be Avoided”
“Governor  of  the  Bank  of  England  Eddie  George  said  Wednesday  he  was  ‘reasonably 
confident’  wider  financial  contagion  from  the  Asia  crisis  could  be  avoided.”  Source:   
Dow Jones International News
Coded: Optimism =1 
09 November 2000: “Korea markets unstable as worries linger-c.bank.”
“South Korea’s financial markets continue to show signs of instability as the second phase 
of financial restructuring progresses, the governor of the central Bank of Korea said on 
Thursday.” Source: Reuters News
Coded: Optimism =-1
19 September 2002: “Mboweni Confident of Financial Stability.”
“SA’s financial regulators are highly optimistic about the stability of the country’s financial 
system,  Tito  Mboweni,  the  SA  Reserve  Bank  governor,  said  yesterday  […]”  Source:   
All Africa
Coded: Optimism =1
10 April 2003: “Fukui says should consider preemptive move on banks.”
“Bank of Japan Governor Toshihiko Fukui said on Thursday that Japan should consider ways 
to provide ailing banks with capital as a preemptive measure before any financial crisis 
occurred.” Source: Reuters News
Coded: Optimism =0
24 September 2003: “Argentina’s Central Bank Downplays Big Bank Restructuring”
“Plans to restructure the Argentine financial sector in the wake of last year’s financial crisis 
do not entail a widespread shakeup of the country’s banks, top Argentine Central Bank 
officials said Tuesday.” Source: Dow Jones International News
Coded: Optimism =0
17 March 2004: “Greenspan says U.S. banking system healthy.”
“Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan said on Wednesday the U.S. banking system 
weathered the 2001 recession well, and was in good shape to help finance the economic 
recovery.” Source: Reuters News
Coded: Optimism =1Appendix: Examples of speeches and interviews and their coding
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11 September 2007: “CREDIT WRAPUP 5-Trichet sure major banks sound, Bernanke 
silent”
“Europe’s banks are sound despite the confidence blow from a U.S. subprime crisis, said 
the head of the European Central Bank on Tuesday, while the [...]” Source: Dow Jones 
International News
Coded: Optimism =1 
05 February 2008: “ECB’s Noyer: Global Fincl System In Crisis For More Than A Year”
“The global financial system has been in a crisis situation for over a year, and the crisis 
isn’t  over,  Bank  of  France  Governor  Christian  Noyer  said  Tuesday.”  Source:  Dow  Jones 
International News
Coded: Optimism =-1
24 September 2008: “Swedish c.bank head repeats financial system stable”
“Swedish Riksbank Governor Stefan Ingves said on Wednesday Sweden was now feeling 
the effects of the recent market turmoil more strongly, but repeated reassurances that the 
financial system was stable.” Source: Reuters News
Coded: Optimism =1
03 October 2008: “Bernanke: Fed to do all it can to combat crisis”
“Federal  Reserve  Chairman  Ben  Bernanke  said  on  Friday  the  U.S.  central  bank  will  do 
whatever it can to combat the credit crisis and help the economy.” Source: Reuters News
Coded: Optimism =0
06 October 2008: “Turkish banks face narrower credit channels-c.bank”
“Central Bank Governor Durmus Yilmaz said on Monday Turkish banks were facing narrower 
credit channels due to the global credit crisis, but said they faced no difficulty in renewing 
external loans.” Source: Reuters News
Coded: Optimism =0 